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Finding the causal effects of liquidity shocks on credit supply is complicated by the 
endogenous relation between loan demand and liquidity position of banks. This paper 
attempts to overcome this problem by exploiting, as a natural experiment, the 
exogenous deposit outflow prompted by the removal of a blanket deposit guarantee 
on time deposits in Japan. We find that just as the government placed a cap on 
insurance for time deposits in 2002, weak banks suffered from a large outflow of 
partially insured time deposits. More importantly, we find that those weak banks were 
not able to raise a sufficient amount of fully insured ordinary deposits to make up for 
the loss of time deposits, which, consequently, forced them to cut back on loan supply. 
These results are consistent with the theory that the imperfect substitutability of 
insured deposits and uninsured deposits affects the tightness of banks’ financing 
constraints and ultimately the supply of bank loans. 
  
JEL Codes: E44, G21  
Key Words: Deposit Insurance, Bank Lending Channel, Japan, Natural Experiment 3 
 
1. Introduction 
The question of how exactly liquidity shocks in a banking sector are transmitted to 
the real economy has long been a subject of active discussion in the field of both 
finance and macroeconomics. On the one hand, according to the Modigliani-Miller 
Theorem, even when exposed to periodic negative liquidity shocks, banks should be 
able to raise sufficient funds from alternative sources swiftly to make up for the 
temporary funding shortfall and thus be able to finance all profitable lending 
opportunities (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). On the other hand, in the presence of 
informational asymmetry on the value of bank assets (i.e., banks know more about the 
quality of their own assets than outside investors do), banks will face a lemon 
premium on external funds, which means that negative liquidity shocks would raise 
overall funding costs, thereby forcing banks to cut back on loan supply to non-
financial sectors (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Stein 1998).
1 
The empirical work on the relationship between liquidity and bank lending 
has explored how bank lending responds to liquidity shocks in aggregate data 
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993; Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995). More recently, the empiricists have moved away from the use of 
aggregate data and have begun to use disaggregated bank-level data. The motivation 
for such a shift in the empirical focus is that the analysis of aggregate data suffers 
                                                            
1 This type of information asymmetry also induces banks with high quality assets to hold an excessive 
amount of risk-free securities so as to avoid having to pay lemon adverse selection premium for 
external funds (Lucas and MacDonald, 1992). 4 
 
from a serious identification problem (i.e., liquidity shocks are likely to coincide with 
shifts in a loan demand schedule).  
Furthermore, the use of bank-level data reveals the exact mechanism of the 
bank lending channel: the effects of liquidity shocks on loan supply are much larger 
for smaller, less liquid, and less well-capitalized banks since the funding 
opportunities of these banks depend critically on the severity of an adverse selection 
problem (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Jayaratne and Morgan, 
2000). 
However, even these recent empirical works potentially suffer from a subtle 
identification problem -- the lending opportunities of banks might not be completely 
orthogonal to their balance sheet characteristics and/or their deposit flows. For 
example, a flow of deposits into banks is not entirely exogenous. Banks with more or 
better lending opportunities might be willing to pay higher interest rates and attract 
more deposits so as to finance those lending opportunities. The low level of 
capitalization or liquidity is not entirely exogenous either. It is likely to be a symptom 
of a worsening economic environment that a particular bank is, or has been, facing; 
i.e., more often than not, banks become poorly capitalized and illiquid as they suffer 
from a large amount of financial losses on their investments.
2 
This paper examines the transmission of liquidity shocks to loan supply in 
Japan’s banking sector. The main innovation of this paper is credible econometric 
                                                            
2 It is also possible that the results might suffer from the bias in the opposite direction if weak banks 
pursue “gambling for resurrection” strategy by aggressively expanding deposits and risky loans (e.g., 
Brumbaugh and Carron, 1987; Kane, 1989; Barth 1991) although literature on the banking lending 
channel has not focused on this issue. 5 
 
identification of liquidity shocks by exploiting the removal of a blanket deposit 
guarantee in Japan as a natural experiment. When the Japanese government lifted a 
blanket guarantee and imposed a limit on time deposits, Japan’s banking system 
experienced a clear regime shift. In the old regime, depositors did not face the risk of 
putting their deposits into “lemon” banks, which in theory must have allowed banks 
to avoid adverse selection problems all together when raising external funds. In the 
new regime, the ability of banks, especially weak ones, to raise partially insured time 
deposits was severely undermined because depositors had incentives to ration funds 
to risky banks in order to protect themselves from financial losses.  
This quasi-experiment is relatively clean because the change in the deposit 
insurance scheme was not driven by deterioration or improvement in banks’ business 
environment. Rather, the lifting of a blanket guarantee was scheduled ahead of time 
so that the timing of the shocks was likely to be orthogonal to the demand condition 
of the banking sector. 
We find four notable results. First, we find that banks seem to have been 
unconstrained during the period of a blanket guarantee: weak banks and strong ones 
expanded their deposits at a similar rate, and loan and deposit growth were 
uncorrelated. Second, we find that as the government placed a cap on deposit 
insurance in 2002, weak banks lost a large amount of partially insured time deposits 
as found in Imai (2006), Murata and Hori (2006), and Fueda and Konishi (2007). 
Third, we find that these weak banks were not able to raise a sufficient amount of 
other types of deposits to replace the loss of time deposits; that is, their total deposits 
declined along with time deposits which were directly affected by the deposit 6 
 
insurance reform. Fourth and last, bank deposit growth, when instrumented with bank 
financial strength, had statistically significant and economically important effects on 
loan growth during the period of transition from a blanket guarantee to a limited 
guarantee. These results highlight the role of imperfect substitutability of insured and 
uninsured deposits in the transmission of liquidity shocks to bank lending.  
The present paper is also relevant to a large body of literature on the bank 
lending channel in Japan (e.g., Ogawa and Kitasaka, 2000; Ito and Sasaki, 2002; Woo, 
2003; Taketa and Udell, 2007). The methodology of this paper is similar in spirit to 
more recent papers (Peek and Rosengren, 2000; Gan, 2007; Watanabe, 2007) that 
make an attempt to pursue more credible identification of financial shocks on the 
capital position of banks.
3 Our results are largely consistent with the commonly-held 
notion that the presence of problem banks led to a reduction in the flow of 
intermediated funds and exacerbated the recession in Japan. 
This paper is also closely related to two recent papers (Khwaja and Mian, 
2008; Paravisini, 2008) in terms of its methodology. Khwaja and Mian (2008) make 
use of the announcement of a nuclear test by the Pakistani government which 
precipitated a rapid outflow of foreign currency deposits from the Pakistani banks in 
order to cleanly identify a deposit shock. Paravisini (2008) uses the exogenous 
infusion of cash from the government to banks in Argentina to study the transmission 
of liquidity shocks to loan supply. The common key element that allows clean 
                                                            
3 Peek and Rosengren (2000) use the Japanese stock market and real estate problems in the early 1990s 
to identify loan supply shocks to U.S. commercial real estate markets. Gan (2007) and Watanabe 
(2007) utilize the collapse of asset values in the early 1990s in Japan and banks’ real estate exposure to 
instrument financial shocks to Japanese banks. 7 
 
identification of liquidity shocks in both these papers and our paper is that the 
external shock is likely to be unrelated to loan demand and it has differential effects 
on the liquidity position of different banks. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly 
describes the background of Japan’s financial system and the nature of the deposit 
insurance reform. Section 3 discusses our data and empirical strategy. Section 4 
presents the results, followed by robustness checks in Section 5. Section 6 concludes 
with possible direction of future research. 
 
1.  Japan’s Financial System 
A. Corporate Reliance on Bank Borrowing 
Banks have played an essential role in the financial system and have been a 
dominant source of external finance for business firms in post-war Japan. Until the 
mid-1980s, the ratio of bank borrowing to total corporate finance was steady at over 
80 percent. Most of the remainder funds were raised by new equity issuance (Hoshi 
and Kashyap, 2001).
4 In the mid-1980s, the government deregulated restrictions on 
the issuing of corporate bonds and motivated firms to shift their finance to domestic 
and foreign bond financing. Bank borrowing, however, still constituted around 75 
percent of the total corporate finance by 1995 and remained a principal means of 
financing for most of the firms. 
                                                            
4 As it is consistent with a view that banks (partially) solves asymmetric information problem in credit 
market by monitoring and maintaining relationships with firms (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Diamond, 
1984, 1991), Japanese firms that had a close tie with banks were found to be less liquidity constrained 
than those without strong bank ties (Hoshi, at al. 1990, 1991). 8 
 
While large, reputable firms gained better access to open markets to raise 
external funds as a result of financial deregulation, small and medium-sized domestic 
firms continued to rely on bank financing (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001). The fraction of 
small and medium-sized business loans to total loans that was 73 percent over the 
period 1977 to 1986 increased to 78 percent over the period 1987 to 1990 (Ogawa 
and Kitasaka, 2000)
5. Hence, Japan’s economy as a whole continued to be highly 
dependent on bank financing and banks seem to have played a central role in the 
economy even after financial deregulation. 
 
B. Evolution of Deposit Insurance System in Japan 
Following the financial turmoil and a number of bank failures in the 1990s, 
the government announced in 1995 that it would provide a blanket guarantee on all 
bank deposits from June 1996 to March 2001 under the objective of avoiding a 
potential systemic banking crisis.
6 Thus, the depositors never faced the real risk of 
losing their deposits during this time period. 
                                                            
5 The corporate reliance on bank borrowing was especially prevalent for small and medium-sized firms 
in the service, construction and real estate industries (Dekle and Kletzer, 2003). 
6 As in other countries the Japanese government gradually expanded deposit insurance coverage over 
time since it was first instituted up to one million yen in 1971. The government raised its cap to three 
million yen in 1972, and ten million yen in 1986. In addition to the formal explicit deposit insurance, 
the Japanese government implicitly guaranteed bank deposits traditionally in the form of the convoy 
system, in which the Ministry of Finance (MOF) encouraged a healthy bank to rescue a failed bank by 
providing both personnel and financial assistance using the reserves of Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(Hoshi, 2002).  9 
 
The blanket guarantee, when it was first introduced, had an expiration date -- 
it was scheduled to be removed in March 2001. The Japanese government, however, 
expressed concern that the end of full guarantees might cause the rapid outflow of 
deposits and severely hurt small and medium-sized financial institutions.
7  
Consequently, in December 1999, the government decided to postpone the re-
introduction of the insurance cap for time deposits by one year and by two years for 
ordinary deposits. In April 2002, the deposit insurance cap of ten million yen was 
placed on time deposits as promised. However, due to the continuing instability of the 
financial system, in October 2002 the government again postponed complete 
implementation of the insurance cap on all the other deposits until April 2005.
8 
Since the time deposits were no longer fully insured after April 1
st of 2002, 
depositors quickly shifted their deposits from time deposit accounts to ordinary 
deposit accounts during the transition period of 2001-2002. Figure 1 illustrates the 
dramatic shift of the deposit composition. Figure 2 highlights the massive outflow of 
large time deposits (over ten million yen) before 2002, suggesting that the reform had 
disproportionately larger effects on large time deposits than small time deposits since 
time deposits less than ten million yen would not be exposed to any risk by the reform. 
In addition to the substantial substitution from time deposits to ordinary deposits, 
                                                            
7 Michio Ochi, chairman of the cabinet-level Financial Reconstruction Commission, expressed a 
concern that, “if 10% of credit cooperatives collapse, there will be an exodus of funds out of the entire 
credit cooperative industry. Such a development would rekindle anxiety toward not only those 
particularly small financial institutions but also the nation's financial industry as a whole.” December 
23, 1999. Japan Economic Newswire. 
8 See more details in Fukao (2007). 10 
 
some studies show that the reform also prompted depositors to reallocate their 
deposits from risky banks to financially healthy banks (Imai, 2006; Murata and Hori, 
2006; Fueda and Konishi, 2007). 
Figure 1 and 2 also show that, time deposits began to decline gradually a year 
before the reinstatement of the insurance cap in April 2002. Since the deposit 
insurance reform was already announced, it is reasonable to infer that some 
depositors were anticipating the reinstatement and reallocated their large time 
deposits ahead of time. Moreover, earlier studies on the reform (Imai, 2006; Murata 
and Hori, 2006; Fueda and Konishi, 2007) show that most of the depositors reacted to 
the reform during the period of transition. 
 
C. The Credit Crunch in 2002 
Many economists argue that the credit crunch which followed the collapse of 
asset prices caused or exacerbated the long economic stagnation, so-called “Lost 
Decade” or “Great Recession” (Kuttner and Posen, 2001; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2004; 
Fukao, 2007). Figure 3 illustrates the fluctuation of lending attitude of financial 
institutions in Japan from The BOJ Tankan.
9 It shows two severe credit crunches in 
1991 and 1998.  
                                                            
9 The BOJ Tankan is compiled by the Bank of Japan based on its quarterly survey about the present 
and future business conditions for Japanese business firms. It is considered to be one of the most 
important economic indicators with which the Bank of Japan conducts its monetary policy. See 
Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999) and the relevant website in BOJ 
(http://www.boj.or.jp/en/theme/research/stat/tk/index.htm) for more details. 11 
 
The first credit crunch followed the collapse of the bubble economy; the sharp 
decline in asset prices drastically undermined the value of wealth and collateral and 
led the economy to a severe recession. The second credit crunch occurred after a 
number of bank failures including the failure of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, a large 
nation-wide bank, and Yamaichi Securities, one of the Japan’s oldest and largest 
brokerage firms. These credit crunches have been studied extensively and reported to 
have had a significant adverse impact on financing costs and real economic activities 
(Motonishi and Yoshikawa, 1999; Peek and Resengren, 2001). 
In addition to these two credit crunches, Figure 3 also displays an additional 
credit crunch in 2002. Figure 4 gives a closer look at the change in the lending 
attitude of financial institutions from 2001 to 2003. It shows that the lending attitude 
worsened sharply in the first quarter of 2002 and remained relatively low in the 
subsequent periods. The common explanation for this credit crunch is the collapse of 
the IT bubble in the 2000.
10 NASDAQ Composite peaked in March 2000 and sharply 
dropped down to one third of its peak in April 2001. As Figure 5 shows, Nikkei 225 
Index also followed a similar path with NASDAQ Composite and consistently 
declined until late 2002. 
However, while the collapse of the IT bubble might have been the culprit for 
the 2002 credit crunch, the timing of the credit crunch does not correspond perfectly 
                                                            
10 For example, “waves from the U.S. high-tech and economic slump continue to crash onto Asian 
shores: Analysts fear the onset of a global recession and Japanese tech giant Fujitsu said Monday that 
it will cut 16,400 workers. The U.S. economy - especially the technology sector - was the primary 
locomotive for the export economies of Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. Now that the bubble has 
burst here, it's having a devastating effect on Asia.” August 21
st, 2001. USA TODAY. 12 
 
to the fall in the stock markets. Despite the sharp decline in stock markets in 2000, the 
lending attitude of Japanese banks remained strong and even improved slightly. 
Instead, the lending attitudes declined sharply much later in the first quarter of 2002, 
which coincided with the removal of a blanket deposit guarantee. According to these 
observations, one can speculate that the reform-induced deposit shock may have 
quickly led to the deterioration in the lending attitude of financial institutions in the 
first quarter of 2002, although it is difficult to make a definite conclusion based on the 
movement of the aggregate variable in response to a one-time shock. 
 
2.  Data and Empirical Strategy 
A. Measurement of Bank Financial Strength 
We choose to use the Moody’s ratings because of well-known unreliability of 
balance sheet items during this particular period in Japan (e.g., Genay, 2002, Fukao, 
2002).
11  While certainly not perfect, it has been shown that Moody’s ratings are 
                                                            
11 As the Japanese government failed to enforce rigorous prudential regulation, the accounting 
measures of bank risk were frequently manipulated by Japanese banks and subsequently began to lose 
its explanatory power for bank’ share prices (Genay, 2002). For instance, banks issued subordinated 
loans to the group-affiliated life insurance companies in exchange for holding subordinated loans and 
surplus notes of those life insurance companies and they gained quasi capital on their balance sheet 
through this “double-gearing” (Fukao, 2002). Not surprisingly, when we use the accounting measures 
of bank risk, we do not find any meaningful results, indicating a serious measurement error. The 
results of these specifications are not reported in this paper to conserve space, but are available from 
the authors upon request. 13 
 
relatively more reliable for evaluating performance of Japanese banks (Bremer and 
Pettway, 2002; Li, Shin, and Moore, 2006). 
The rating used here is Moody’s Long-Term Bank Deposit Ratings (MBDR), 
which measure a bank’s ability to repay punctually its foreign and/or domestic 
currency deposit obligations. I assign numerical values to each rating in the ascending 
order: MBDR = 1 for “Aa3”; MBDR = 2 for “A1”; MBDR = 3 for “A2”; MBDR = 4 
for “A3”; MBDR = 5 for “Baa1”; MBDR = 6 for “Baa2”; MBDR = 7 for “Baa3”; 
MBDR = 8 for “Ba1”. The assigned number reflects degree of bank risk (i.e., the 
riskier the bank, the higher the MBDR).  
 
B. Loans and Deposits 
The main variables of our interest are loans and deposits. Those financial 
variables including total, time, and ordinary deposit and total loan are drawn from 
Nikkin Shiryo Nenpo (Annual Report on Japan’s Financial Institutions) published by 




C. Empirical Strategy 
We expect a bank’s liquidity constraints to be tight only when depositors face 
the significant possibility of default under the partial guarantee and are concerned 
about the risk of picking “lemon” banks. Thus, there is no compelling reason to 
                                                            
12 See Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A for the complete list of data descriptions, sources and 
summary statistics. 14 
 
expect deposits at weak banks to grow slower than those at strong banks during the 
period of full guarantees. On the other hand, we expect that under the partial 
guarantee, weak banks will suffer from an outflow of uninsured deposits. As a result, 
if uninsured and insured deposits are not perfect substitutes, their total deposits will 
fall, which, in turn, translates into the leftward shift of the loan supply schedule.  
To implement this empirical strategy, we relate bank deposits to banks’ risk 
profiles in the first stage regression. In the second stage, we explore how a deposit 
shock affects loan supply. We identify deposit shocks by an instrumental variable 
approach. Since the reform made deposits sensitive to bank default risk and the 
deposit supply was reallocated largely based on bank financial strength, we can use 
the bank financial strength as an instrument to purge the endogenenous components 
of deposits that are correlated with loan demand.
  
Hence, we first examine a simple statistical relationship between the growth 
of various types of deposits and bank financial strength: 
 
01 ii i Deposit MBDR           (1) 
 
∆Deposit is growth of time, ordinary or total deposit. MBDR is Moody’s Bank 
Deposit Ratings at the beginning of fiscal year. A subscript i indicates the bank. 
Using cross-sectional bank-level data, we estimate the equation for 2001-2002, the 
transition period when the reform provided depositors with the incentive to reallocate 
their funds across different types of deposit accounts and different banks. Therefore, 
we expect MBDR to be negatively correlated with partially insured time deposits. 
However, in the equation for ordinary deposit, we expect the coefficient on MBDR to 15 
 
be positive since risky banks should attempt to make up for the shortfall of time 
deposits by issuing more ordinary deposits which were still fully insured unlike time 
deposits. 
If insured deposits are perfect substitute for uninsured deposits, then weak 
banks would be able to raise a sufficient amount of funds from other types of deposits 
to fully compensate for the loss of time deposits and, consequently, total deposits 
should remain the same. Under this scenario, the coefficient on MBDR in the equation 
for total deposits will be small and statistically insignificant. If, on the other hand, 
insured and uninsured deposits are not perfect substitutes, then weak banks would 
face increasing marginal costs as they attempt to raise additional funds, which, in turn, 
forces banks to cut bank on loan supply. Under this scenario, the coefficient on 
MBDR in the equation for total deposits will be negative, just like in the equation for 
time deposits. 
We also estimate the same equation for 2000-2001, the period of a full deposit 
guarantee, as a falsification exercise. During this period, given that all deposits were 
fully guaranteed, there is no reason to expect MBDR to have had any effects on the 
supply of deposits. If deposit growth turns out to be negative correlated with MBDR 
even during 2000-2001, we would have to suspect that there might have been 
systematic relation among loan demand, deposit demand, and MBDR. 
  In the second stage, we relate loan growth to deposit growth while 
instrumenting the latter with MBDR: 
 

01 ii i Loan Deposit            (2) 
 16 
 
∆Loan is total loan growth and 
i Deposit  is the predicted value of the deposit growth 
from the first stage regression.
13 We use Limited Information Maximum Likelihood 
(LIML) method as it is shown to be more robust to weak instrument problems, 
compared to Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) (Stock and Yogo, 2002). If banks are 
liquidity-constrained, loan supply should be positively correlated with the change in 
deposit; that is, the coefficient on 
i Deposit  should be positive. 
 
3.  Baseline Results 
Table 1 reports the estimation results of simple OLS regressions of loan 
growth on deposit growth for 2001-2002 and 2000-2001 in columns 1-4 and the   
results of the IV regression (Equations (1) and (2)) for 2001-2002 and 2000-2001 in 
columns 5-10. Panels A and B report the results of the first stage and second stage 
equations, respectively. The third row gives dependent variables that are estimated for. 
TIME,  ORDI, TOTAL, and LOAN represent growth of time deposits, ordinary 
                                                            
13 In this specification, we relate the loan growth during 2001-2002 to a contemporaneous deposit 
shock that is caused by the reform; that is, we assume that bank loan responds rather quickly to deposit 
shocks. It might be reasonable to question this assumption: it might take bank loans much longer to 
respond to deposit shocks. We try relating the 2002-2003 loan growth to the 2001-2002 deposit shocks 
but we do not find any meaningful results (the results are available from the author upon request), 
suggesting that bank lending responds to deposit shocks relatively quickly. The quick response of loan 
supply to deposit shocks is documented in other papers as well. Paravisini (2008) finds that financial 
shocks to constrained banks in Argentina have an immediate effect on loan supply and the lending 
response occurs within a quarter from the shock. Khwaja and Mian (2008) also find that loan supply 
shifts swiftly in response to liquidity shocks in their study of Pakistani banks. 17 
 
deposits, total deposits and total loans, respectively. The coefficients on MBDR 
capture sensitivity of the deposit growth to bank default risk.  
In OLS, the coefficient on Time Deposit Growth turns out positive and 
statistically significant for loan growth for the transition period in 2001-2002 (column 
1) whereas loan growth was uncorrelated with deposit growth during 2000-2001 
(columns 3-4). These results are consistent with the view that the availability of time 
deposits was indeed a major determinant of loan supply during 2001-2002 while it 
was not a constraint for banks to expand loans during the period of the blanket 
guarantee. Although the deposit growth in these regression equations is endogenous 
(and the results should be interpreted with caution), these pieces of evidence seem to 
confirm the view that the nature of the deposit insurance scheme is related to the 
tightness of liquidity constraints in the banking sector. 
The IV results also show a strong negative correlation between bank default 
risk (MBDR) and time deposit flows in the post-reform period (column 5, Panel A), 
indicating that depositors became sensitive to bank default risk in the selection of 
banks and withdrew more time deposits from those poorly rated (or financially weak) 
banks.  
The coefficient on MBDR is positive but not statistically significant in the 
equation for ordinary deposit (column 6, Panel A). These results are in accordance 
with the fact that the reinstatement of the insurance cap was placed only on time 
deposits. Since the ordinary deposit was still fully insured, depositors switched their 
time deposit accounts to ordinary deposit accounts. If all the depositors just switched 
their time deposit account to an ordinary deposit account within the same bank, we 18 
 
should observe a statistically significant rise in ordinary deposits absorbing all the 
losses of time deposits. The fact that the coefficient is positive but not statistically 
significant, however, implies that some depositors might not have simply switched 
the accounts but moved away from financially weak banks to strong ones or to other 
financial tools.  
These results on ordinary deposits also confirm that the observed decline in 
time deposits was not driven by a decline in loan demand; i.e., if the leftward shifts in 
loan demand schedule had been the culprit, ordinary deposits at weak banks would 
have declined along with time deposits. 
Column 7 in Panel A shows that MBDR is negative and statistically significant 
for the growth of total deposits, which also suggests that financially weak banks could 
not fully replace the loss of time deposits with other deposits. This implies that time 
deposits and other deposits are not perfect substitutes.
14  
In contrast to the results for the period 2001-2002, bank default risk did not 
have any significant effects on deposit flows in the pre-reform period (columns 8-10, 
Panel A). Before the implementation of the insurance cap, depositors had no incentive 
                                                            
14 These results also highlight the violation of the Modigliani-Miller theorem. Modigliani-Miller 
theorem states that, in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information, firms have 
perfect substitutability between any financing methods and that market will supply the funds for all 
projects that yield an expected positive net present value (Miller and Modigliani, 1958). Thus, if the 
assumptions of Modigliani and Miller theory hold, total funding growth should be unaffected by the 
availability of time deposits. The empirical fact that the total deposit growth was affected by financial 
weakness and the shift in the availability of time deposits suggests that financial markets are not 
perfect. 19 
 
to actively select financially strong banks, and therefore, banks’ financial strength 
was irrelevant to deposit flows under the full deposit guarantee. Those extremely low 
R-squared and F-Statistic also underscore that bank default risk is uncorrelated with 
the deposit flow. These results also serve as placebo tests. If MBDR is spuriously 
correlated, in a systematic fashion, with lending opportunities and thus demand for 
external funds across individual banks, MBDR should have a statistically significant 
coefficient even during the 2000-2001; i.e., in order to finance their good lending 
opportunities, highly rated banks should aggressively pursue deposits. The results 
suggest that such phenomena did not occur in 2000-2001, which indicates that MBDR 
is likely to be a valid instrument which is strongly correlated with the deposit growth 
but uncorrelated with the lending opportunities of individual banks in 2001-2002. 
  Finally, even when instrumented with MBDR, the coefficient on Time Deposit 
Growth is positive and statistically significant (column 5, Panel B), meaning that 
poorly rated banks reduced loan supply in response the outflow of time deposits. The 
positive and statistically significant coefficient on Total Deposit Growth (column 7, 
Panel B) also indicates that there is a strong correlation between loan growth and the 
exogenous component of total deposit growth.
15  In particular, this coefficient is 
approximately equal to one, suggesting that the magnitude is economically important: 
a loss of deposit by 1 percent leads to a contraction of loan supply by 1 percent. In 
                                                            
15 Note, however, that the results on the total deposit growth (column 7) are not as reliable as those on 
the time deposit growth, given the results seem to exhibit a weak instrument problem with F-Statistic 
of 6.045. 20 
 
sum, these results suggest that banks view insured and uninsured funds as imperfect 
substitutes, which makes bank loans more sensitive to funding shocks. 
 
4.  Robustness Checks 
While our simple framework generates evidence for the presence of the bank 
lending channel, it is possible that there might be some missing confounding factors 
that we have not accounted for. In particular, isolating shifts in loan supply schedule 
from shocks affecting loan demand is always a formidable task in the bank lending 
channel literature since the interaction of loan demand and supply determines the 
observed loan quantity. The omission of the loan demand factor thus could cause 
overestimation bias when estimating loan supply if determinants of loan supply are 
allowed to absorb the effects of loan demand on loan quantity. In our case, although 
we have established that Moody’s rating was likely to be uncorrelated with loan 
demand (and deposit demand) during 2000-2001, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that such correlation arose during 2001-2002 for some reasons that are unknown to us. 
In this section, we make various attempts to control for heterogeneity across banks.  
 
A. Geographical Differences 
Those banks in our sample operate in different parts of Japan and thus face 
different demand conditions, depending on the performance of local economies. To 
control for heterogeneity in local loan demand, we use four different prefecture-level 
variables: land price, GDP, bankruptcy, and job opening ratio. Land price is the 
average annual price indices of commercial sites of prefectures and obtained from 21 
 
Japan Statistical Yearbook published by Statistics Bureau, Director-General for 
Policy Planning (statistical standards) and Statistical Research and Training Institute 
of Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication. GDP is annual prefecture level 
GDP complied by Cabinet Office of the Government of Japan. The number of 
bankruptcies is from Teikoku Bank Data. The job opening rate is calculated as the 
number of job seekers divided by the number of job openings and drawn from 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. All the variables are calculated into annual 
growth.  
Since these loan demand controlling variables are at a prefecture-level while 
the rest of the variables in the data set are at a bank-level, we construct the branch-




_( _ * _ )
_
i ji j j
i





where BANK_DEMAND is the branch-weighted average of a loan demand variable 
for a bank i,  TOTAL_BRANCH is the total number of branches of bank i, 
PREF_DEMAND is a loan demand variable for prefecture j, and PREF_BRANCH is 
the number of branches of bank i in prefecture j. This equation is used to calculate 
each loan demand variable separately. For instance, a branch-weighted land price for 
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where PREF_LAND is the growth rate of the land price index in commercial sites for 
prefecture j. 
  Table 2 displays the results. The coefficients on MBDR remain negative and 
statistically significant for both time and total deposit growth in the first stage (Panel 
A). Similarly, in the second stage results, the coefficients on Time Deposit Growth 
and Total Deposit Growth are positive and statistically significant (Panel B). Hence, 
our main results are statistically robust to the inclusion of these additional control 
variables. The coefficients on deposits in columns 7-8 in Panel B are slightly smaller 
in magnitude compared to the results without any demand controls in Panel B of 
Table 1. This aligns with our anticipation that controlling for demand corrects the 
overestimation bias that was expected to be present in the results for Equation (2) in 
Table 1.  
 
B. Bank Type 
Banking literature shows that banks of different sizes serve different types of 
borrowers. In particular, large banks tend to serve large borrowers while small banks 
tend to serve small opaque borrowers (Berger, Miller, Petersen, and Rajan, 2005). 
Thus, if demand condition changes for a particular segment of borrowers in a way 
that is correlated with bank size, excluding the size of banks might give misleading 
results. Although financial deregulation blurred the difference between small local 
banks and large nation-wide banks in Japan, it might still be the case that small local 
banks serve mainly small opaque borrowers relative to large banks (Uchida, Udell 
and Watanabe, 2008). To address this issue, we include the log of bank assets to 23 
 
capture bank size and dummy variables for trust banks, tier I regional banks, and tier 
II regional banks as additional controls.
16 
Table 3 reports the results of these specifications. Even after including these 
controls, the results largely match the previous findings that bank default risk has 
negative and significant effects on deposit flows in the first stage (Panel A) and that 
the instrumented values of deposit growth are positively correlated with loan growth 
in the second stage (Panel B). Bank size turns out to be positive and statistically 
significant for total deposit growth (column 2, Panel A) and negative and statistically 
significant for loan growth (column 2, Panel B). These results suggest that depositors 
reacted to the deposit insurance reform by putting their money into large banks which 
happen to have had limited lending opportunities relative to the average bank in our 
sample.  
Trust and Tier I Regional Banks have a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for time deposit growth (column 3, Panel A). This indicates that those 
non-city banks or smaller banks attracted more time deposits or suffered less from the 
time deposit outflow holding everything else constant. In the second stage, the 
coefficients on regional bank dummies are positive and statistically significant 
                                                            
16 There are four major types of commercial banks in Japan; city bank, Tier I and Tier II regional bank, 
and trust bank. City banks are large major commercial banks that base their headquarters in a big city 
and have nation-wide operation. Regional banks are small or medium-sized banks that operate in 
specific local areas. They are divided into Tier I and Tier II regional banks: Tier I regional banks are 
generally larger than Tier II. Trust banks are commercial banks that specialize in being a trustee of 
various kinds of trusts and in managing estates. These four types of banks constitute over 80 percent of 
the total assets held by all the banks operated in Japan. 24 
 
(column 3, Panel B), suggesting that the lending opportunities of small regional banks 
had improved, relative to that of large nationwide banks, during the sample period. 
For total deposits, the coefficients on the bank type dummy variables in the first stage 
are negative but none of them is statistically significant (column 4, Panel A).  
In the second stage, the coefficients on all the dummy variables, however, are 
positive and statistically significant (column 4, Panel B), which is consistent with the 
earlier result that non-city banks issued more loans on average. When bank size and 
dummy variables for bank types are included at the same time, the coefficients on 
these variables lose statistical significance in the second stage, suggesting some 
collinearity problem (columns 5-6, Panel B). 
 
C. Controlling for Loan Write-Off 
Peek and Rosengren (1995) point out that it might be misleading to use the 
change in outstanding loans as a measure of the change in the credit availability 
because the change in the outstanding loans reflects more than just new loan 
origination but also includes charge-offs, transfer of real estate loans to other real 
estate owned due to foreclosures, and net loan sales. One might worry that this 
criticism is especially applicable to our study because the Japanese banks 
accumulated a large number of non-performing loans and might have been compelled 
to write off a large number of non-performing loans from their balance sheets. 
Moreover, if weak banks had to write off more bad loans than strong ones in a 
systematic fashion during the sample period, then MBDR is no longer valid 
instrument since it is mechanically correlated with loan growth through differential 25 
 
amounts of loan write-offs.  In this robustness check, we add these write-offs back to 
the total amount of loans and calculate the loan growth so that the changes in loans 
are not attributed to the loan write-offs.  
Table 4 reports the results with write-off adjusted loan growth. While the size 
of coefficients on the deposit growth decreases slightly compared to the baseline 
results (Panel B, Table 1), these results are qualitatively similar. The results also 
suggest that, although the amount of write-offs during the sample period was 




D. Panel IV Estimation 
  The last possible confounding factor we consider is time-invariant bank 
specific demand conditions; i.e., if unobserved bank specific characteristics that are 
correlated with loan demand are also correlated with MBDR, then the results are 
biased. To address this issue, we pool the data from 2000 to 2002 and carry out panel 
IV estimation with bank fixed effects, which should purge out the effects of 
unobserved bank characteristics that are time-invariant.  
Table 5 reports the results. REFORM*MBDR is an interaction term of a 
dummy variable for 2001-2002 and MBDR. This variable captures sensitivity of the 
deposit growth to bank default risk during the period of transition. REFORM*SIZE is 
an interaction term of a dummy variable for 2002 and SIZE that is lagged by one. 
This captures sensitivity of deposit and loan to SIZE after the reform in 2002.  26 
 
  The coefficients on REFORM*MBDR are negative and statistically 
significant in the equations for time deposits (columns 1, 3 and 5, Panel A), implying 
that the deposit insurance reform made time deposits sensitive to bank default risk. 
Furthermore, those coefficients on Time Deposit Growth are positive and also 
statistically significant in all the equations (columns 1, 3, and 5, Panel B), suggesting 
a positive correlation between instrumented deposit growth (i.e. exogenous deposit 
shock) and loan growth.
17   The coefficient on REFORM*SIZE is negative and 
statistically significant in both the first and second stage (column 5), suggesting that 
larger banks lost more time deposits and made fewer loans during the transition from 
the full guarantee to the limited one from 2001-2002. REFORM*SIZE is statistically 
significant in neither the first nor second stage (column 6). These results are all in line 
with all the previous findings and support our main conclusions. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper utilizes the exogenous deposit outflow caused by the removal of a 
blanket deposit guarantee in Japan to investigate the impact of liquidity constraints on 
loan supply in Japan’s banking sector. The empirical results show that as the 
government placed a cap of deposit insurance in April 2002, depositors began to 
reallocate deposits based on banks’ financial strength and bank deposit became 
sensitive to bank default risk. Furthermore, weak banks that experienced a large 
outflow of time deposits could not fully make up for the loss with other types of funds 
due to imperfect substitutability of insured and uninsured deposit. 
                                                            
17 The results on total deposits seem to exhibit the sign of weak instrument problem (e.g., low first 
stage F-statistics and large standard errors in the second stage results).  27 
 
More importantly, we find that bank deposit growth, when instrumented with 
bank financial strength, had a statistically significant and economically important 
impact on loan growth during the period of transition from a blanket to a limited 
guarantee. These results suggest that liquidity shocks matter to loan supply precisely 
in an environment where the adverse selection problem becomes an issue when 
raising uninsured deposits. 
  While this paper presents strong evidence for the presence of liquidity 
constraints in the particular context of Japan’s deposit insurance reform, one may 
wonder whether the results can be generalized to other settings. In particular, one can 
speculate that these results are likely to depend on the fragility of financial 
institutions, informational environments and liquidity of financial systems as a whole. 
Similar to the case of Japan, as many as 14 countries have also adopted a temporary 
blanket guarantee during the financial crisis and shifted back to a limited guarantee 
(Laeven and Valencia, 2008). Hence, a similar experience in deposit insurance regime 
in other countries provides a suitable test ground to replicate our results, which should 
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Data Description and Source 
Variables Description  Source 
Total Loan Growth  Annual growth of total loans  Nikkin Shiryo Nenpo (Annual Report on 
Japan’s Financial Institutions) from the 
Japan Financial News 
Total Deposit Growth  Annual growth of total deposits  Nikkin Shiryo Nenpo (Annual Report on 
Japan’s Financial Institutions) from the 
Japan Financial News 
Time Deposit Growth  Annual growth of time deposits  Nikkin Shiryo Nenpo (Annual Report on 
Japan’s Financial Institutions) from the 
Japan Financial News 
Ordinary Deposit Growth  Annual growth of ordinary deposits  Nikkin Shiryo Nenpo (Annual Report on 
Japan’s Financial Institutions) from the 
Japan Financial News 
SIZE  Log of total assets  Nikkin Shiryo Nenpo (Annual Report on 
Japan’s Financial Institutions) from the 
Japan Financial News 
MBDR  Moody’s long-term bank deposit ratings Lexis-Nexis  Academic  Universe 
Land Price Growth  Growth of average prefectural land price of 
commercial sites 
Japan Statistical Yearbook 
GDP Growth  Growth of average prefectural GDP  Kenmin Keizai Keisan Nenpo (Annual 
Report on Economic Statistics in Prefecture) 
from the Office of Cabinet 
Bankruptcy Growth  Growth of the number of bankruptcies  Zenkoku Kigyo Tosan Shukei (National 
Bankruptcy Statistics) from Teikoku 
Databank 
Job Opening Rate Growth  Growth of ratio of job opening to job 
applicants 
Rodo Shijo Nenpo (Annual Report on Labor 






Variables   2000-2001  2001-2002  2000-2002 



























































































































Source: Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/) 
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Relationship between bank risk, deposit and loan in 2001-2002 and 2000-2001 
This reports the results of the simple OLS regression of the loan growth on the deposit growth (columns 1-4) and the first stage equation (Equation 1) in Panel A 
and the second stage equation (Equation 2) in Panel B in columns 5-10. TIME, ORDI, TOTAL and LOAN represents the growth of time deposit, ordinary deposit, 
total deposit, and loan. MBDR represents Moody’s Bank Deposit Ratings. The coefficients on MBDR capture sensitivity of the deposit growth to bank default risk. 
Time Deposit Growth and Total Deposit Growth in the second stage regression (Panel B) represents the predicted values of the time deposit growth and the total 
deposit growth based on the first stage regression, respectively. F-Statistic for Panel A is Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-Statistic (weak identification test). 
                  Panel A (1st Stage of IV Regression) 
 2001-2002  2000-2001  2001-2002  2000-2001 
   (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Dependent Variable  LOAN  LOAN LOAN  LOAN TIME  ORDI  TOTAL  TIME ORDI  TOTAL 
MBDR         -0.0282*** 0.0178  -0.0116**  -0.00343  0.000717  -0.00280 
          (0.00689) (0.0119) (0.00470) (0.00744) (0.00425) (0.00428) 
Time Deposit Growth  0.390***    -0.00915               
 (0.111)    (0.130)               
Total Deposit Growth    0.456    0.125             
   (0.295)    (0.167)             
Constant 0.0411**  -0.0269**  -0.00320  -0.00643 -0.0139  0.309***  0.0738***  0.0179  0.0831***  0.0390* 
 (0.0172)  (0.0121)  (0.00673)  (0.00518)  (0.0342)  (0.0644) (0.0226)  (0.0386) (0.0218)  (0.0202) 
R-squared 0.269  0.134  0.000  0.017  0.305 0.035 0.140  0.004 0.000  0.009 
F-Statistic 12.45  2.383  0.00493  0.565 16.80  2.245  6.045 0.212  0.0284  0.428 
                 
          Panel B (2nd Stage of IV Regression) 
         2001-2002  2000-2001 
Dependent Variable         LOAN    LOAN  LOAN    LOAN 
Time Deposit Growth          0.449***      -0.168     
         (0.162)      (1.128)    
Total Deposit Growth              1.098**      -0.205 
             (0.538)      (1.435) 
Constant         0.0503*    -0.0370**  -0.00294    0.00205 
         (0.0266)    (0.0145)  (0.00801)    (0.0408) 
Observations  40 40  40  40  40  40  40 40 40 40 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses 44 
 
Table 2 
Robustness check with additional controls for loan demand in 2001-2002 
Panels A and B report first stage and second stage results, respectively. TIME, TOTAL and LOAN represents the 
growth of time deposit, total deposit, and loan, respectively. MBDR represents Moody’s Bank Deposit Ratings. The 
coefficients on MBDR capture sensitivity of the deposit growth to bank default risk. Time Deposit Growth and Total 
Deposit Growth represent the predicted values of the first stage equation. Land Price Growth, GDP Growth, 
Bankruptcy Growth, and Job Opening Ratio Growth is the growth of branch-weighted land price index, GDP, 
bankruptcies and active job opening, respectively. F-Statistic is Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic (weak 
identification test). 
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Panel A (1st Stage of IV Regression) 
Dependent Variable  TIME  TOTAL  TIME TOTAL TIME TOTAL  TIME  TOTAL 
MBDR 0.0283***  0.0116** 0.0292*** 0.0112** 0.0282*** 0.0116** 0.0295*** 0.0113**
 (0.00703)  (0.00478) (0.00703) (0.00487) (0.00648) (0.00479) (0.00668) (0.00514)
Land Price Growth  -0.00320  -0.0111          -0.0259  -0.0107 
  (0.0401)  (0.0250)       (0.0420)  (0.0262) 
GDP Growth      0.385  -0.166      0.269  -0.175 
     (0.602)  (0.505)     (0.646)  (0.525) 
Bankruptcy Growth          -0.153  0.0105  -0.160  0.00344 
         (0.114)  (0.0694)  (0.117)  (0.0715) 
Job Opening Ratio               0.315*  0.0628 
Growth          (0.164)  (0.102) 
F-Statistic 16.18  5.902  17.23 5.260 18.88 5.827  19.51  4.839 
             
  Panel B (2nd Stage of IV Regression) 
Dependent Variable  LOAN  LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN 
Time Deposit Growth  0.456***    0.352**    0.452***   0.361**   
  (0.165)   (0.145)  (0.162)   (0.141)   
Total Deposit Growth    1.108**    0.920*    1.102**    0.943* 
    (0.547)  (0.515)  (0.532)    (0.511) 
Land Price Growth  -0.0353  -0.0245          -0.0148  -0.0140 
  (0.0311)  (0.0356)       (0.0313)  (0.0378) 
GDP Growth      -1.133** -0.845*      -1.093**  -0.831* 
     (0.575)  (0.505)     (0.551)  (0.501) 
Bankruptcy Growth          0.176*  0.0955  0.140  0.0792 
          (0.106) (0.113) (0.0922) (0.102) 
Job Opening Ratio               0.0167  0.0711 
Growth          (0.0874)  (0.102) 
Observations  40  40 40 40 40 40  40  40 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses 45 
 
Table 3 
Robustness check with additional controls for size and type in 2001-2002 
Panels A and B report first stage and second stage results, respectively. TIME, TOTAL and LOAN represents the 
growth of time deposit, total deposit, and loan, respectively. Time Deposit Growth and Total Deposit Growth in the 
second stage are the predicted values of the time and total deposit growth based on the first stage. SIZE is log of 
total asset. Trust Bank, Tier I Regional Banks and Tier II Regional Banks are dummy variables for those types of 
banks. F-Statistic is Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic (weak identification test). 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Panel A (1st Stage of IV Regression) 
Dependent Variable  TIME  TOTAL TIME TOTAL TIME TOTAL 
MBDR -0.0312*** -0.00876* -0.0275*** -0.0103** -0.0251*** -0.00692
 (0.00750)  (0.00476) (0.00672)  (0.00456) (0.00695) (0.00479)
SIZE -0.0192  0.0290***     0.0358*  0.0510* 
 (0.0164)  (0.0100)      (0.0208)  (0.0295) 
Trust Bank      0.170***  0.00137  0.199***  0.0422 
      (0.0618) (0.0484) (0.0560) (0.0548) 
Tier I Regional Banks      0.0918**  -0.0421  0.162***  0.0587 
      (0.0366) (0.0351) (0.0497) (0.0847) 
Tier II Regional Banks      0.0354  -0.0549  0.108  0.0482 
      (0.0653) (0.0663) (0.0730) (0.103) 
Land Price Growth  -0.0258  -0.0109  0.00283  -0.0175  0.0172  0.00301 
 (0.0519)  (0.0147)  (0.0467)  (0.0221) (0.0358) (0.0163) 
GDP  Growth  0.424 -0.410 0.167 -0.448 0.202 -0.398 
  (0.640) (0.517) (0.481) (0.638) (0.461) (0.492) 
Bankruptcy Growth  -0.130  -0.0426  -0.00218  0.00995  -0.0373  -0.0401 
 (0.113)  (0.0730)  (0.139)  (0.0869) (0.137) (0.0777) 
Job Opening Ratio Growth  0.248  0.163  0.259*  0.108  0.314*  0.187* 
  (0.150) (0.103) (0.141) (0.111) (0.163) (0.105) 
Constant 0.305  -0.399**  -0.0929**  0.0971*** -0.722*  -0.801 
 (0.274)  (0.168)  (0.0399)  (0.0324) (0.360) (0.531) 
R-squared  0.403 0.335 0.570 0.251 0.592 0.370 
F-Statistic  17.29 3.385 16.70 5.097 13.08 2.088 46 
 
    (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Panel B (2nd Stage of IV Regression) 
Dependent Variable  LOAN  LOAN  LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN 
Time Deposit Growth  0.422***    0.394**    0.354*   
  (0.119) ` (0.157)  (0.183)  
Total  Deposit  Growth   1.504**   1.052***    1.285** 
   (0.629)   (0.379)    (0.556) 
SIZE -0.0207  -0.0724***     0.0166  -0.0363 
 (0.0128)  (0.0270)      (0.0263)  (0.0370) 
Trust Bank      0.0475  0.113***  0.0675  0.0836 
      (0.0605) (0.0411) (0.0714) (0.0546) 
Tier I Regional Banks      0.0634*  0.144***  0.0999  0.0819 
      (0.0354) (0.0286) (0.0705) (0.0587) 
Tier II Regional Banks      0.0774*  0.149**  0.112  0.0885 
      (0.0435) (0.0752) (0.0704) (0.0902) 
Land Price Growth  -0.0130  -0.00754  -0.00243  0.0171  0.00437  0.00660 
 (0.0239)  (0.0165)  (0.0291)  (0.0280) (0.0371) (0.0241) 
GDP  Growth  -0.942*  -0.146  -0.856** -0.319 -0.833** -0.250 
  (0.518)  (0.532)  (0.436) (0.359) (0.391) (0.445) 
Bankruptcy  Growth  0.183** 0.192*** 0.178** 0.167**  0.162*  0.200** 
 (0.0793)  (0.0723)  (0.0866)  (0.0850) (0.0831) (0.0846) 
Job Opening Ratio Growth  -0.0738  -0.214  -0.0503 -0.0623 -0.0145  -0.143 
  (0.0957) (0.134) (0.0867)  (0.0753) (0.0993)  (0.115) 
Constant 0.367*  1.096***  -0.0140  -0.153*** -0.310  0.463 
 (0.195)  (0.412)  (0.0495)  (0.0279) (0.477)  (0.614) 
Observations  40  40  40 40 40 40 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Robustness check with write-off adjusted loan from 2000-2002 
TIME, TOTAL and LOAN2 represents the growth of time deposit, total deposit, and loan adjusted for 
write-offs, respectively. Time Deposit Growth and Total Deposit Growth in the second stage are the 
predicted values of the time and total deposit growth based on the first stage. This is the same equation as 
in Table 1 but write-off adjusted loan is used instead of unadjusted loan. The results of the first stage 
regression are identical to those reported in Panel A of Table 1, and thus not reported. 
   2001-2002    2000-2001 
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
  Panel B (2nd Stage of IV Regression) 
Dependent Variable  LOAN2  LOAN2  LOAN2  LOAN2 
Time Deposit Growth  0.425***    -0.320   
 (0.149)    (1.217)   
Total Deposit Growth    1.038**    -0.391 
   (0.510)    (1.541) 
Constant 0.0489**  -0.0337**  -0.00141  0.00810 
 (0.0249)  (0.0138)  (0.00856)  (0.0432) 
Observations 40  40  40  40 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




Robustness check with pooled panel regression with bank fixed effects (2000-2002) 
Panels A and B report first stage and second stage results, respectively. TIME, TOTAL and LOAN represents the 
growth of time deposit, total deposit, and loan, respectively. Time Deposit Growth and Total Deposit Growth in 
the second stage are the predicted values of the time and total deposit growth based on the first stage. 
REFORM*MBDR is an interaction term of MBDR and the reform dummy variable for the period 2001-2002 to 
capture sensitivity of the deposit growth to bank default risk in 2001-2002. REFORM*SIZE is an interaction of 
one lagged log of asset and the reform dummy variable. F-Statistic is Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic (weak 
identification test). The standard errors are clustered by each bank. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Panel A (1st Stage of IV Regression) 
Dependent Variable   TIME  TOTAL TIME TOTAL TIME TOTAL 
REFORM*MBDR -0.0230***  -0.00800  -0.0257*** -0.00807 -0.0266*** -0.00666 
  (0.00684) (0.00486) (0.00537) (0.00488) (0.00539) (0.00560) 
SIZE       0.412***  0.173 
       (0.146)  (0.230) 
REFORM*SIZE       -0.0687***  0.00186 
       (0.0154)  (0.0151) 
Land Price Growth      -0.0548  -0.00616  -0.0606  -0.00857 
      (0.0465) (0.0263) (0.0544) (0.0259) 
GDP Growth      0.569  0.0543  0.533*  0.105 
      (0.567) (0.346) (0.315) (0.277) 
Bankruptcy  Growth      -0.0125  0.00134 -0.00198 0.00110 
      (0.00796) (0.00807) (0.00845) (0.00751) 
Job Opening Ratio Growth      0.472***  0.0254  0.169*  0.0353 
      (0.139)  (0.0780) (0.0904) (0.0676) 
1st Stage F-Statistic  11.26 2.705 22.92 2.732 24.31 1.412 
        
  Panel B (2nd Stage of IV Regression) 
Dependent Variable   LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN 
Time  Deposit  Growth  0.569**  0.501**   0.560***   
  (0.244)  (0.208)  (0.199)  
Total  Deposit  Growth   1.632  1.596  2.237 
   (1.034)  (0.990)  (1.671) 
SIZE       -0.263*  -0.419 
       (0.153)  (0.635) 
REFORM*SIZE       0.00814  -0.0344 
       (0.0187)  (0.0342) 
Land Price Growth      -0.00315  -0.0208  0.00375  -0.0110 
      (0.0186) (0.0322) (0.0162) (0.0420) 
GDP Growth      -0.216  -0.0172  -0.303  -0.240 
      (0.314) (0.539) (0.250) (0.517) 
Bankruptcy Growth      0.00932  0.000927  0.00876  0.00520 
      (0.00697) (0.0150) (0.00731) (0.0171) 
Job Opening Ratio Growth      -0.0829  0.113  -0.0768  -0.0612 
     (0.123)  (0.116)  (0.0716)  (0.121) 
Observations  80 80 80 80 80 80 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses 
 